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Abstract
One of the consequences of globalization appears to
be a radical shift in our traditional value systems. Our identi-
ties as human beings are no longer defined by our religions or
cultures, but are generalized as a global identity. This new
global identity emphasizes the material self-sufficiency of in-
dividuals. The dignity of the ‘human being’ is reduced to the
level of a ‘consumer’, and our values are redefined in accor-
dance with the requirements of global community. Increas-
ingly, it is scientific realism that guides our value system. This
robs human beings of their moral freedom, and the possibility
of a meaningful and purposeful life. In this paper an attempt
is made to show how scientific realism can be balanced with
a recovered philosophical idealism in order to prevent the
continued deterioration in the quality of human life.
Introduction
What is popularly known as globalization is the byproduct of our
technological age, which in turn is the offshoot of our scientific rationality.
The pervasive phenomenon called globalization has had its impact on all
aspects of social life of individuals. As a consequence of this impact, there
appears to be a radical shift in our traditional value systems in general.
This is conspicuous in the life-style led by the individuals in the modern
societies. Such a life-style necessitates us to redefine our value systems to
suit our new world-view which is directly or indirectly regulated by glo-
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balization. There are two ways of approaching human being. One way is
to approach him through the culture in which he or she is brought up. Such
a view of human being becomes culture specific and strengthens the doc-
trine of cultural relativism. Broadly speaking, it is the culture that provides
man with any social identity. The identity, either physical or social, of any
individual reveals his or her accidental features. To say that ‘I am brown
complexioned’ or ‘I am an Indian’ is to define one’s accidental attributes.
They are the external marks of individual's identity. The other way of ap-
proaching human being is to see him beyond any culture. In other words,
one has to look at man as man. This is how the essential nature of human
being is realized. What is problematic here is to define this essential nature
of human being for it is always defined in terms of something else.  As
Wittgenstein suggested we should not ask for the definition of it, rather,
we must look for it. We will come to this issue in due course. Apart from
these two approaches, the third approach is to look at human being within
the global culture which attaches a distinctive identity to the human indi-
viduals. Under this new identity there is a danger of individuals losing their
respective cultural identities for all the cultural identities get subsumed un-
der the universal or global identity. But this universal or global identity
should not be confused with the spiritual identity advocated by the various
religions of the world. The spiritual identity certainly strengthens the hu-
man values and the quality of human life for it rests on the basic premise
that the human nature is essentially the same everywhere. On the contrary,
the global or universal identity of the individuals under the sway of global-
ization only strengthens the material self-sufficiency of individuals.  The
natural consequence of such an identity is that the expression ‘human be-
ing’ is replaced by the expression ‘consumer’. Or the expressions ‘human
being’ and ‘consumer’ are used as synonyms. A human being becomes
essentially a consumer in the context of globalization. In the process, the
scientific realism reigns supreme in the form of technological development
and the philosophical idealism which stands for human ideals or values
gets completely neglected. Or our values are redefined in accordance
with the requirements of global community. Normally it is our value sys-
tem (ideals) that guides our scientific activity. What is good for human and
social well-being alone is pursued by the sciences.  But in a technologi-
cally advanced global society it is the science that guides our value sys-
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tem. In other words, science is no more under the control of human be-
ings, but rather, we are under the control of science. This is the paradox.
If science exercises its authority on human conduct then human beings are
treated as the ultimate subjects of modern science and technology. We
should not invite such a situation. First of all, the polarization between the
ideal (ought) and the real (is) results in the lopsided development of hu-
man personality as well as human societies. The conflict between the ideal
and the real ultimately emerges as a conflict between philosophical ideal-
ism and scientific realism. Secondly, the domination of scientific realism
over philosophical idealism robs human beings of their moral freedom and
meaningful and purposeful life. Every living organism lives and dies but
without realizing the meaning and purpose of its life. In this context I would
like to recall the distinction made by Sartre between ‘being-in-itself’ and
‘being-for-itself’. What Sartre intends to show here is that human indi-
viduals have greater dignity than stones, tables, and other living creatures.
What gives humans the grater dignity over other existents is their subjec-
tive life. Being-in-itself is to possess unconscious existence. On the con-
trary, being-for-itself represents the conscious life led by the humans. Simi-
larly, while discussing the nature of pleasure Mill criticizes Bentham for he
failed to distinguish quantitative pleasure from a qualitative one.  It is in this
context Mill holds that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied rather than a
fool satisfied. In this paper an attempt is made to show how the mesmer-
izing effect of scientific realism would promote globalization which ulti-
mately dehumanizes the basic human character. Unless and until a bal-
anced approach towards philosophical idealism and scientific realism is
adopted there is going to be deterioration in the quality of human life.
Philosophical Idealism
The expression ‘idealism’ is basically construed in two senses. In
one sense it is understood that every system of philosophy sets forth cer-
tain ideals to be realized for the well being of individual and society. In this
sense, every system of philosophy is idealistic in its character. Even Marx-
ism is not an exception to this characterization. In another sense, idealism
represents an ontological position wherein ideas are treated as primary
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and matter secondary or derivative. Those systems of philosophy that
oppose this view claim themselves to be anti-idealist. But philosophical
idealism in the present context must be understood in the sense that phi-
losophy as a discipline aims at certain ideals to be realized. The ancient
Greeks held that philosophy is born out of man’s sense of wonder and
inquisitiveness expressed in questions “What are things really like?” and
“How can we explain the process of change in things?” As Stumpf puts it:
“What prompted these questions was the gradual recognition that things
are not exactly what they seem to be, that “appearance” often differs from
“reality”.”1 In our day-to-day life we are often carried away by the ap-
pearances without probing into the very reality of these appearances.
Philosophers have advanced diverse explanations with regard to the dis-
tinction between appearance and reality. For instance, the classical and
modern empiricists in the West, and the ancient Indian materialists like
Carvaka could not see anything beyond sense-experience. Hence, they
identified all that is perceived (appearance) with reality.  Similarly, prag-
matists explained the reality of anything and everything in terms of its utility
and function. There are many different conceptions of reality. I do not
propose to go into the details at this juncture. Here we are not talking
about the reality which scientists and likeminded philosophers explained
in terms of material or physical phenomenon. Traditionally, philosophy is
viewed as a reflective and evaluative enterprise. It reflects on the essential
meaning and purpose of life and its subordinate activities and the terms
under which these activities are carried on.  As Ingram views it:
The essential means the most basic, the most necessary, and/or the most
universal features of some activity or thing. It is what defines something
in its innermost identity, relating it to things that are like it and distinguish-
ing from the things that are not. Although this defining activity is similar
to that of social and political scientist’s penchant for constructions classi-
fications, it involves considerably more than the mere description of real-
ity; it prescribes a norm or ideal to which the activity or the thing being
defined must conform in order for it to be truly what it is. Therefore, the
definitions sought by philosophers have a critical edge.2
What is most important to notice in the above passage is that the
reality of any activity or thing is assessed on the basis of a norm or an ideal
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to which it has to conform.  This is the reason why the ancient Greeks time
and again emphasized the need to distinguish between wisdom and knowl-
edge. It is through philosophical wisdom norms or ideals are arrived at.
Knowledge is always knowledge of appearances. A natural scientist ar-
rives at knowledge of a given phenomenon by means of observation and
experimentation. Philosophy, on the contrary, is fundamentally conceived
as the ‘love of wisdom’. Even in the Indian tradition philosophers are
characterized as the seekers of truth. A philosopher is one who digs out
the truth which exists beneath the appearances. Also, the Indian philoso-
phers are a step ahead of the ancient Greeks in holding the view that
philosophers should not remain as mere lovers of wisdom, but must also
lead the life of wisdom. It is the philosophical wisdom that reveals the
ideal character of anything or activity.
It is true that even science makes a distinction between appear-
ance and reality. But this distinction is confined to the analysis of facts of
existence. Even for a scientist what is real is true. There is no dispute
about this. But philosophical idealism, on the contrary, proposes that to
be real is to be ideal and vice-versa. This means a philosopher puts for-
ward only those ideals which can be realized for otherwise ideals remain
utopian. Similarly what is real must be in conformity with the ideal pro-
jected. Therefore, one needs to distinguish between a real which is em-
pirically real from a real which is ideally real. The latter is arrived at by
means of philosophical reflection and evaluation. To arrive at the ideals
which can be realized in a meaningful and purposeful life is the job of a
philosopher. The following illustration may help us in understanding it in a
better way. The concept of ‘human being’ is explained in terms of cut and
dried matter possessing certain number of chromosomes by a physiolo-
gist. If one does not possess the required number of chromosomes then
that entity is not classified under the class ‘human being’. A bat may ap-
pear to be a bird but in reality it is a mammal for a zoologist. This is
decided on the characteristics possessed by the animal in question. A
philosopher cannot come into picture here for his reflection and evaluation
are of no use to judge whether a particular animal is a bird or mammal.
For a philosopher a human being is one who possesses humanity. But
how would one interpret this concept. If humanity is treated as an essen-
tial ingredient of human beings then the attributes which make up this hu-
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manity such as rationality, ensoulment, consciousness of self, and posses-
sion of meaningful world are subjected to critical reflection and evaluation
by philosophers.  But all these attributes acknowledge the normative or
ideal status of humanity. If humanity is viewed in any of the above men-
tioned ways then humanity consists of potentials that ought to be realized.
The ideal fulfillment of potentials depends upon human agency. It may be
realized or may not be.
There is also another possibility. It is to make philosophy confine
itself to the ideals which can be realized. What is to be realized must be
made possible by the scientific rationality. As in the case of Aristotle's
four-fold theory of causation in which formal cause is the ideal or the
blueprint. This blueprint becomes a reality when it is realized as a final
cause. Similarly, philosophical idealism provides us with a blueprint of the
life-world with some ideals to be realized. Before we construct a massive
structure we go for a blueprint of it. It is the builder who has to bring this
structure into reality. It is the job of a scientist to arrive at the world-view
that conforms to the ideal blueprint of a philosopher. Therefore, it is the
ideal that precedes the real. We must be a bit cautious here when we talk
about the reality. We are not talking about the natural world (natural real-
ity) which is the given world. We are concerned with that world or reality
which is transformed into a life-world by the intervention of human agency.
Scientific Realism
Scientific realism, on the contrary, has its own role to play in shaping
the life-world of the individuals. All the changes that are brought about by
modern science and technology for leading a comfortable life-style by the
humans are received with mixed reaction. To quote the remark of Ziman
in this context: “Science has become a major part of the stock of our
minds; it products are the furniture of our surroundings.”3 In the context of
globalization science and technology become two important determining
aspects of the quality of life led by the individuals in any society. There-
fore, the progress of these two indicators of qualitative life becomes a
matter of pride for any society. Technology as an applied form of science
has become the basic means of production in modern economy. It goes
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without saying that mass production leads to mass consumption. As Ravetz
puts it: “The technocratic view of science is that of a basic factor of pro-
duction, needing ever-increasing supplies of highly-trained ‘scientific man-
power’. This view of science is descendant, in a simplified and vulgarized
form, of a tradition extending from Francis Bacon down through Karl
Marx.”4 Bacon defined knowledge in terms of power and Marx equated
philosophy with political economy according to which the major advances
in science and technology boost the needs of production. The boost in
production is linked up with the better economic stability of any society
and the comfortable living of the individuals in any industrialized society.
But this technocratic view of science is dangerously one-sided for it con-
verts science into an ideology. Also, there is a danger of scientism perco-
lating into every form of human life by dislodging moral rationality from its
sphere.  Here the expression of ideology is nothing but false conscious-
ness which is often oppressive.
One of the worst consequences of the monopoly of science and
technology over any society is that science assumes to be an independent
and self-contained factor in deciding the life-style of the individuals. Glo-
balization, being the offshoot of industrialization, initially aims at catering
to the specific needs of consumers on the basis of contract. Once this
requirement is taken care of the excess stock of commodities produced
under this contract are dumped on the developing and the underdevel-
oped countries. Thus, globalization  gradually spreads its tentacles by con-
verting the developing and underdeveloped nations into its dumping ground
of its rejected products elsewhere. The survival of globalization is invari-
ably dependent upon the industrialized science. As Nash views it, indus-
trialized science and science-based industry are closely related to each
other. One cannot make any neat bifurcation between these two. In the
case of industrialized science, it is primarily the needs of the industry that
are to be taken care of by the science. On the contrary, science-based
industry tries to augment its production by making use of the techniques of
modern science.5 In other words, globalization encourages only those forms
of science and technology that promote false needs at the cost of the
genuine needs of individuals living in a society. Its ultimate aim is profit
making at any cost. First of all individuals themselves must have philo-
sophical wisdom to make a distinction between genuine and false needs.
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The genuine policy makers must keep this distinction in mind before rec-
ommending a particular course of action.
Partly the burden rests on the community of individuals to guide
our science and technology to meet the ideals of life. Just as food, clothing
and shelter are accepted as the basic needs of human life, freedom, hap-
piness, and justices are accepted as the true ideals of human life. Unfortu-
nately modern science and technology are oriented towards augmenting
our commercial and military capabilities. The big business establishments
in the world today found it more profitable to venture into the commer-
cialization of military needs which range from ordinary military uniforms to
sophisticated weapons of mass destruction.  Now it is the turn of the
military technology to dominate all other forms of technology. As citizens
of human community how horrific it would be to see science as a new
Leviathan. It is a dangerous body of knowledge which is esoteric, inhu-
man and increasingly dominant.6 This form of science and technology is
not guided by any ideals but by power and domination. It is true that
scientific temper has to be cultivated to oppose superstition and dogma,
but not to oppose values. Every scientist as a humanist must also realize
his social responsibility as a scientist.
The inventor of electricity should not think that he would not be
harmed by it if he accidentally comes into contact with a live wire just
because he invented it. A scientist as a citizen of human community must
not become a victim of his own discoveries and inventions any more than
the fellow citizens. If science is pampered to destroy the human values
then it becomes fully authoritarian in style, giving the young or old no
opportunity to develop their powers of criticism and judgment. “The in-
creasing power of natural science thus threatens the destruction of hu-
mane understanding among educated people as the humane studies are
increasingly deprived of prestige, of time in university teaching programmes,
and of resources of research. As a result, our thinking about ourselves and
the world around us becomes grossly materialistic and quantitative; the
higher sensibilities and values are crushed beneath the machine.”7
One must realize that the fundamental differences among humani-
ties, social sciences, and natural sciences are more of degree than of kind.
Each discipline has its own role to play in the life-world of individuals.
When it is a question of decision making between two available alterna-
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tives, it is philosophical wisdom that comes to one’s rescue but not the
knowledge of any particular science. Reflective thinking and evaluation
are the two fountains of philosophical wisdom. Possessing scientific knowl-
edge is different from how to make use of what is possessed.  One must
realize that science does not survive “by manpower units alone; and with-
out some ideal to replace that of the pursuit of truth it could soon degen-
erate. Moreover, to the extent that science becomes organized around the
service of commercial and military industry, it will be subjected to the
criticism of being dirty work.”8
There is a reason for calling modern science a dirty work for it is
solely responsible in creating problems of environment or bio-sphere Slowly
people are coming to realize how modern science in the form of industri-
alized science has become more and more hazardous.  Consequently the
social and ethical problems become the deepest problems to understand
the adverse impact of industrialized science of present day. There is no
wonder when one says that science has lost its pristine purity. Here in this
context we must make a distinction between professional ethic and gen-
eral ethic. A scientist may follow all the prescriptions of a professional
ethic to keep his discipline hale and hearty. But general ethic is more inter-
ested in keeping the whole society hale and hearty. For philosophical ide-
alism it is the latter which is important.
Concluding Remarks
The above discussion brings out the defects of both philosophical
idealism and scientific realism if they are pursued independent of each
other. The failure of philosophical idealism is witnessed when the philoso-
phers like Plato, Marx and Gandhi failed in their attempts to cerate ideal
societies of their respective periods. Plato’s ‘ideal state’, Marx’s ‘com-
munist society’, and Gandhi’s ‘Rama Rajya’ turned out to be mere uto-
pian ideals for they were never realized in the history of mankind; and it is
doubtful whether there would be any scope for the realization of them in
future. Here our contention is not to undermine their dream projects for
the welfare of mankind, but the question is: How realistic are they?  There-
fore, philosophical idealism can no more nurture such ideals which remain
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as museum pieces or reified ideals. An ideal is something which translated
into a concrete reality. Similarly, scientific realism cannot boast about its
achievements in the form of technological advancement for it is going to
be detrimental to the furtherance of human race on the globe if the present
day science and technology are not properly guided by philosophical ide-
alism. Scientific realism would be like a ship without a captain in the ab-
sence of philosophical idealism. It is set adrift in the waters without any
direction. We have already noticed the dangerous consequences of pur-
suing modern science and technology without any moral base.  The ethical
basis of science has its source in philosophical idealism. But in modern
society, as consumers, we have already become slaves to scientific real-
ism. Before the situation worsens we must come to our senses to revolt
against excesses of modern science which is a tool or weapon in the hands
of big industrialists to suppress human dignity. Human dignity consists in
the freedom that one enjoys. Loss of freedom results in loss of creativity.
Science ultimately becomes a walking stick for us without which we can-
not move a few feet.  This was anticipated by Michael Polanyi, the well-
known physical chemist, Karl Popper, a well-known philosopher of sci-
ence, and Robert K. Merton, a well-known sociologist. Polanyi held that
science progresses in a disciplined way without causing any danger to
human welfare only when it is undertaken by the free and dedicated men.
In other words, free and dedicated men need not be scientists by them-
selves, but as principal observers they orient it towards human welfare.9
Karl Popper viewed science as an embodiment of intellectual honesty
which is realized through the principle and practice of criticism.10 And
Merton held that the ethos of science stands for the realization of highest
standards of civilized human behaviour.11 All of them anticipated dangers
to science. According to Polanyi, the deterioration of science starts when
bureaucracy, power and control determine the direction of science. For
Popper it is the intellectual dishonesty and non admittance of any criticism
that lead to its downfall. Merton viewed that the inherent conflict between
the norms of cooperative scientific endeavour and those of lay society and
state will contribute to its negative impact. Some eminent Marxist theore-
ticians like J.D. Bernal believed that science is primarily concerned with
the society and social development. Therefore, a scientist has an obliga-
tion towards the welfare of the society. This is being done by the science
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without losing its integrity and freedom.12
If science is not to degenerate, it requires both philosophical wis-
dom and highest ethical commitment. Majority of the scientists today in-
dulge in ‘mission-oriented’ research. They do not have freedom to work
on their own as they have fixed targets. The moral dilemma is whether an
individual scientist pursues his scientific research for his own immediate
benefits by turning his back to the sufferings of humanity or would he
pursue his scientific research with strong social conscience and faith in
human values. The present day scientific research prefers the former rather
than the latter. Especially in the context of globalization this dilemma be-
tween the ideal and the real persists. In our normal course of life it is the
ideal which guides our real course of action. But it is unfortunate that the
real is projecting what should be the ideal in the form of false needs. In
other words, we are virtually allowing scientific realism to dominate our
philosophical idealism.
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